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Early modern culture incorporated the human hand 
into a large number of different visual-textual 
contexts: in religious imagery, in scientific 
illustrations, in manuals of various disciplines, as 
manicules in manuscripts and printed books, and 
with several functional and/or figurative 
significances in the literature and drama of the 
period. Hands seem to be thrusting themselves into 
these contexts as powerful reminders of a human 
agency, which is often both somatic and spiritual at 
the same time: in the human hand, relations 
between body and mind converge and contest in 
complex and multiple ways. As described by Claire 
Sherman in the exhibition catalogue Writing on 
Hands: Memory and Knowledge in Early Modern 
Europe, the early modern hand is “a meeting place 
of matter, mind, and spirit” (21).1 This meeting 
place is, in several different ways, the implied 
setting for the following article. Some hands, such as 
Albrecht Dürer’s Praying Hands (1508) or 
Michelangelo’s meeting hands of God and Adam on 
the Sistine Chapel ceiling (1508-1512), have 
become enduring and familiar icons of visual 
culture; and of course, Dürer’s and Michelangelo’s 
hands are found within religious contexts in which 
the hand has always played vital roles related to 
matter, mind and spirit. However, besides the vast 
field of religious studies, there are more and other 
hands offering rich sites for exploring early modern 
chiasms of body and mind.2 In the following 
analyses of examples from early English cross-over 
contexts, our purpose is to highlight and discuss the 
ways in which the hand and in particular two of its 
most familiar functions – pointing and touching – 
may illuminate wider epistemological discourses 
that shift back and forth throughout the period: 
discourses on what a human being is and how 
humans perceive and understand the world they 
live in. Central here are questions as to how and 
where human perception and cognition take place; 
in the mind or in the body; or to be more precise: 
how bodies and minds are understood in relation to 
each other by early modern thinkers.3  
We present an investigation of a selection of 
examples which span the dramatic writing of the 
period: from issues of the hand in two early 
Shakespearean tragedies, Titus Andronicus (c. 1594) 
and Romeo and Juliet (c. 1597), to Hamlet (c. 1602); 
to the medical sciences, William Harvery’s de Motu 
Cordis (1628); and to John Bulwer’s manuals on 
gesture, Chirologia and Chironomia (1644). Extracts 
from Bulwer’s manuals are also useful because their 
fluid generic qualities allow us both to provide a 
contextual backdrop specifically concerned with the 
hand for our other examples, as well as bridging 
some of the disciplinary gaps between them. At the 
same time, we want to acknowledge the fact that the 
early modern period did not, as William M. Hamlin 
writes, “recognize the strong disciplinary 
demarcations we typically acknowledge today” (5). 
Writers like Bulwer or Robert Burton, whom we 
also refer to, do not distinguish rigidly between 
their multiple interests, and we have therefore 
chosen the term “cross-over contexts” instead of the 
potentially anachronistic “interdisciplinary”. The 
order in which these examples appear is not based 
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on chronology or causality, but thematically 
arranged precisely in order to show their differing 
and overlapping epistemological discourses and the 
ways in which they illuminate relations between 
bodies and minds.  
Perception and Cognition – Bodies, Minds, and 
Hands   
 
Early modern description of perception and 
cognition is fraught with questions of how bodies 
and minds relate to each other – as intertwined and 
organic, or as separate and even competing material 
and immaterial human components. On the one 
side, the process of obtaining knowledge was 
complexly, but distinctly described as embodied and 
physiological: as Bruce R. Smith puts it in The Key of 
Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance 
Culture, “before Descartes, thinking color, like 
thinking anything else, was a whole-body 
experience” (3).4 In this Aristotelian influenced 
account, knowledge of the world was generally 
understood to be obtained by way of the five 
outward senses – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting 
and touching – sending the acquired information to 
the inner ‘common sense’, which, as Robert Burton 
describes in Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), was 
classified as “the judge and moderator of the rest” 
(101).5 Sense information was then processed by 
the other inner senses – the “fancy or imagination” – 
before stored by the “memory” and all inner senses 
were described as situated organically within the 
brain. Another well-known key factor in the 
framework of embodied perception was Galen’s, at 
the time still strongly influential theory of the four 
humours – blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. 
These were thought to regulate the human body 
and its emotions by way of fluids (humours) 
dispersed throughout the body by the three 
“spirits,” natural, vital and animal, originating 
respectively from the liver, the heart and the brain; 
a process also described in some length by Burton. 
However, on the other side, Burton’s 
predominantly physiological accounts also contain 
elements that could be read as contradictory 
formulations within the overall discursive 
framework. In the subsections on “the Rational 
Soul” and “the Understanding,” he describes a 
component which, although working by organs, is in 
itself inorganic and incorporeal,6 and Burton is not 
the only early modern thinker to provide several 
and diverse descriptions of how his knowledge of 
the world is obtained and processed. Leading up to 
and contemporary with René Descartes’s 
paradigmatic separation of body and mind in 
Discourse on the Method and the Meditations 
(1637),7 other discourses on perception are 
blurring a straightforward acknowledgement of the 
senses as the only viable way to knowledge, as well 
as questioning the fundamental understandings of 
knowledge per se. Two important early modern 
influences are key factors in this context: tendencies 
to doubt and question forms of knowledge 
stemming from classical scepticism, which saw a 
strong revival around the turn of the century.8 Such 
tendencies, as has often been noted, explode in the 
conflicting epistemological discourses of Hamlet 
and we will draw on their influence in our reading 
of the play. Concurrently, the sciences were 
developing rapidly and, in doing so, also 
questioning the reliability of the senses in procuring 
knowledge and understanding, as we shall see when 
investigating the role of the hand in a series of 
illustrations from William Harvey’s treatise on 
blood circulation De Motu Codis.9 In early modern 
scepticism and co-related issues of science, the act 
of doubting becomes an inevitable factor in the 
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ongoing separation of mind from body, which is 
fully embraced in Descartes’s understanding of the 
pursuit of knowledge. Francis Bacon too, not only 
rejects the reliability of sensory perception, but 
claims doubt as the first and most fruitful step on 
the path to learning in The Advancement of Learning 
(1605): “if a man will begin with certainties, hee 
shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to 
beginne with doubts, he shall end in certainties” 
(31). The same principle is echoed by Descartes, 
who arrives at his famous cogito ergo sum sentence 
by rejecting  
as absolutely false everything as to which I 
could imagine the least ground of doubt, in 
order to see if afterwards there remained 
anything in my belief that was entirely 
certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes 
deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing 
is just as they cause us to imagine it to be. 
(Discourse 101)  
For Descartes that which in the end is absolutely 
certain, is the existence of his thinking self separate 
from his body, because it is that thinking self which 
is capable of generating doubt. In addition to 
influences of scepticism and science, it is 
undoubtedly important also to keep in mind that 
much of this debate originates in classical 
philosophy with the agon between Platonic dualism 
and the degradation of physical senses to the lower 
world (as opposed to the higher world of Forms or 
Essences); and Aristotelian confidence in sensory 
experience. Both Aristotelian and Platonic 
influences were preserved and channelled into the 
early modern period via the Scholastic thought of 
Thomas of Aquinas as opposed to Augustinian neo-
Platonic philosophy. So the body/mind split 
decisively put forward by Descartes does not 
necessarily just signal the paradigmatic end-point of 
early modern embodied understandings of the self, 
but may be understood as part of continuous – and 
continuously shifting – discourses all of which 
influence the epistemological landscape of the early 
modern period.10  
The early modern hand and two of its most 
familiar functions – touching and pointing – 
represent a condensed, but central site for exploring 
some of these diverse and diverging understandings 
of human perception and cognition. Hands and their 
functions may intersect configurations of body and 
mind, illuminating as well as confusing relations 
between these, whether understood as intricate or 
separate. Furthermore, the role of the hand is 
crucial in relation to questions of how outward 
bodily signs, such as gesture, relate to human 
interiority. Questions on how thoughts and 
emotions may be hidden within or detected without 
are frequent in the period and central within certain 
of our examples, particularly and famously in 
Hamlet. In our investigation, centred on Bulwer’s 
work on gestures in dialogue with Harvey and 
Shakespeare, the hand is thus situated at a cross-
section where outward and inward movements of 
human perception, cognition, emotion, and bodily 
expression meet. A sensory perceiver – in touching, 
the hand is also an extension of the mind – in 
pointing. Pointing can be understood as an active 
gestural movement projecting outward and forward 
what is in the mind of the pointer; it is associated 
with indication and demonstration, and provides a 
sense of direction. In the act of pointing there will 
always appear to be a clear distinction between the 
subject who points and the object pointed at, not 
least because of the obvious spatial distance 
between them. A hand that touches, however, 
bridges this distance. Rather than just projecting 
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something unto to what it touches, it takes in what it 
perceives; a touching hand receives information and 
sends it inwards. The perceptive act of touching 
implies a certain permeable quality to the hand 
(certainly to the skin covering it). Thus touching, as 
we shall explore further on, is significantly passive 
as well as active; it is a movement of the hand that 
potentially blurs distinctions between perceiving 
subject and perceived object.11  
 
“Spokesman of the Body” – John Bulwer’s 
Handbooks 
 
John Bulwer’s two manuals on gesture with more 
than a hundred different illustrations, Chirologia: or 
the Natural Language of the Hand and Chironomia: 
or the Art of Manual Rhetoric published in 1644, 
provide valuable insight into early modern 
understandings of gestural expression. Bulwer was 
a physician and teacher of the deaf, and the manuals 
appear to have been partly intended as a treatise on 
 
Figure 1 Diagram from John Bulwer, Chirologia. 
All images in this article can be found at archive.org 
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sign language, but clearly developed into a study of 
everything historically and culturally related to 
gesture, with a strong focus on rhetoric in 
Chironomia and with abundant examples from 
classical literature and Scripture. Although there is 
no direct relation between the manuals and the 
stage, and Bulwer’s works obviously postdate 
Shakespeare’s career as well as the closing of the 
theatres in 1642, especially his illustrations are 
nonetheless often used in investigations of non-
verbal effects of early English theatre (Figure 1).12  
Several of the gestures described and depicted 
occur in Shakespearean dialogue and stage 
directions, and scholars have therefore been able to 
establish at least some visual evidence of a gestural 
vocabulary used by early modern actors and 
presumably understood by their audiences13, but 
comparatively less attention has been paid to the 
textual parts of the manuals and Bulwer’s 
arguments developed in them. We deal here with 
extracts only from Chirologia, foregoing the 
extensive discussion of the hand’s importance to the 
contexts of rhetoric in order to concentrate on 
material more closely related to the outlined 
questions of mind/body relations. Among Bulwer’s 
more radical claims are his description of gesture as 
a natural and universal language, ‘spoken’ and 
understood by all people (a pre-Babel form of 
human expression),14 and his argument that gesture 
actually precedes spoken language happening 
almost simultaneously with thought. It is the latter 
idea which is of main interest to our investigation. 
Bulwer writes: 
 
Since whatsoever is perceptible unto sense, 
and capable of a due and fitting difference; 
hath a natural competency to expresse the 
motives and affections of the Minde; in whose 
labours, the Hand, which is a ready midwife, 
takes often-times the thoughts from the 
forestalled Tongue, making a more quicke 
dispatch by gesture: for when the fancy hath 
once wrought upon the Hand, our 
conceptions are display’d and utter’d in the 
very moment of a thought (4).   
There seems to be a symbiotic relationship between 
inward thinking and the outward expression of the 
body in this description. Bulwer’s manual body-
language is ‘natural’ in its immediate cause and 
effect, whereas the tongue takes time in dispatching 
the thoughts, denoting that verbal language is 
somehow less natural than a purely physical 
expression. At the same time, the mind and the hand 
also appear as distinct properties with a 
hierarchical co-relation, the hand working as “a 
ready mid-wife” to the mind and being “wrought 
upon” by the fancy. So, while Bulwer imagines the 
hand as a more direct source to the workings of the 
mind, the hand is also a servant to thought. Or is it? 
If gesture happens ‘in the very moment of a 
thought’, there must be a co-active relation between 
them more intricate and indistinguishable than the 
model of dominating soul over mechanical body, 
formulated a few decades later by Descartes.15 
Bulwer in fact seems to be operating simultaneously 
with differing understandings of mind/body 
relations; one in which the body (hand) is symbiotic 
and co-active with thought, in the sense that mind 
and body are inseparable and one in which the hand 
is a ready midwife to thought, hinting at bodily 
expression serving what can be understood as 
independent cognition. This plural understanding is 
further illuminated and complicated, when 
compared to a particular Shakespearean example. 
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Handling the Theme of Hands 
Nowhere in the Shakespearean canon are the uses 
and significances of hands more consistent and 
central than in Titus Andronicus, Shakespeare’s 
early and excessively bloody Roman tragedy (c. 
1594). Taking his main inspiration from Ovid’s tale 
of Philomela in The Metamorphoses, Shakespeare 
has Titus’s daughter Lavinia raped and her tongue 
cut out, but adds to the gore by having her hands cut 
off as well. Titus himself cuts off his left hand as part 
of a petition to the emperor, and throughout the 
play, hands - and the actions implied by them - are 
concurrently presented as both material and 
metaphorical often resulting in grotesquely 
overcharged puns.16 One of several instances of this 
self-conscious excess is Titus’s reproaching reply 
(from which our title for this article is partly taken) 
to his brother Marcus in act three, when Titus and 
Lavinia have just one hand left between them: “Ah, 
wherefore dost thou urge the name of hands / To 
bid Aeneas tell the tale twice o’er / How Troy was 
burnt and he made miserable? / O handle not the 
theme, to talk of hands, / Lest we remember still 
that we have none” (3.2.26-30). This short scene, 
which displays Titus’s rapidly growing insanity, 
contains a high number of explicit and implicit 
references to gestures. Initially Titus laments the 
loss of his left hand because he cannot, as Marcus 
appears to be doing, express his grief with a gesture 
of folded or wringing hands. That particular gesture, 
“Ploro” (Figure 2), is associated with the act of 
crying and described thus by Bulwer: “TO WRING 
THE HANDS is a naturall expression of excessive 
griefe used by those who condole, bewaile and 
lament” (28).  
It occurs too in Romeo and Juliet: “Ay me, what 
news? Why dost thou wring thy hands (3.2.36)?” 
and, as we shall see, in Hamlet. As Titus continues 
his lament, however, we find more implied manual 
action significantly confusing relations between 
body and mind:   
 
This poor right hand of mine 
Is left to tyrannize upon my breast, 
Who, when my heart, all mad with misery,  
Beats in this hollow prison of my flesh, 
Then thus I thump it down (3.2.7-11). 
Titus here clearly implies a gesture in the “thus” 
beating at his chest with his remaining hand, but the 
syntax in the passage is odd.17 Initially, the “poor 
right hand” is the subject of the construction, but in 
the last line Titus reinserts himself as subject with 
the pronoun in the first person: “Then thus I thump 
it down”. It is as if Titus’s body at first expresses 
emotion in what Bulwer would argue is inter-
relatedness of gesture and thought, but then his 
dominating, even if disintegrating, intellect takes 
over the execution and meaning of his gesture. His 
body, in the end, is merely a “hollow prison” of 
flesh; his beating heart is “thumped” down by a 
hand that he controls. However, the fact that this 
hand was the executing subject, even if briefly, 
suggests a wavering understanding of where the 
body ends, and where the mind takes over. Not 
 
 
Figure 2 Detail from diagram from John Bulwer, 
Chirologia. 
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unlike Bulwer, Titus displays mind/body 
understandings in which an embodied passionate 
self co-exists and overlaps with a separate intellect 
capable of mastering bodily functions. Both are 
moving inwards and outwards at the same time in 
the visualisation of the beating heart within, being 
kept down from without. The hand is absolutely 
centrally placed at an intersection of these; partly as 
a body part with a will of its own and partly as a tool 
to the will of its master. Titus’s hand and its double 
significances are concretized by returning to Bulwer 
and his descriptions of our two key manual 
functions: pointing and touching.  
Outwards and Forwards: “Gesture F: Indico” 
On the act of pointing Bulwer begins thus:  
THE FORE-FINGER PUT FORTH, THE REST 
CONTRACTED TO A FIST, is an expresse of 
command and direction; a gesture of the 
hand most demonstrative. This Finger being 
called Index ab indicando, Deiticos by the 
Greeks, id est Demonstrator (162).  
The illustration “F” with the title “Indico” (Figure 3) 
provides the viewer with the sense of active 
command and direction described by Bulwer. The 
hand depicted here may be interpreted as 
containing a sense of determination, due to the way 
in which it implies a strong and direct line through 
the arm to the point of the index finger. Being, as 
Bulwer says, used to demonstrate (and of course 
figuratively to point something out), the gesture of 
pointing is perhaps the most familiar of all manual 
signs and also appears in the form of the manicule 
in various early modern disciplines.18 It is closely 
aligned with sight in directing another person’s eye 
towards the object pointed at, but there is also 
frequently a claim to superior knowledge or status 
implied in the action. It has an obvious performative 
quality both in the contexts of conferring distinction 
upon somebody (literally “to appoint”) or denoting 
shame or accusation. As earlier explained, there is a 
clear distance measured out between subject and 
object; so that whoever performs the pointing is 
somehow in command. Bulwer also describes how 
persons of authority use the gesture: 
As it is a gesture of command and direction, 
imperious masters with a stately kinde of 
arrongancie often use it to their meniall 
servants who stand ready expecting but the 
signall of their commands, when they call 
them, not without a taunt, to execute the tacit 
pleasure of their lordly will; an expression 
flowing into their Hand from the hauntinesse 
of spirit, and an indolent humor of 
dominæring: (166).    
The vocabulary of “spirit” and “humour”, as well as 
the described flowing movement from within the 
body out into the hand and index finger, implies 
that Bulwer might rely mainly on humoral theory 
here, but in the following paragraph he begins to 
separate the immediate correspondence between 
meaning of mind and the body signalling it: the 
 
 
Figure 3 Detail from diagram from John Bulwer, 
Chirologia. 
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meaning of the great man’s mind is to be guessed at 
by his servants, it is not naturally and easily 
apprehended: 
And the signe of pride is the greater when 
men affect to have their minds thus descried, 
and put others to guesse at their meaning by 
what their talking Fingers exhibit, as if their 
high raised spirits disdained to discend so 
low as to explaine their minde in words, but 
thought it more then enough to signe out 
their intent with their Fingers (166).    
The pointing hand here serves the mind of who 
performs the gesture, as the servants in Bulwer’s 
description serve their masters. We perceive a 
movement that works from the inside outwards, the 
mind or spirit of the master is projected out into the 
world via the hand, and others are directed by it. By 
contrast, touching appears to provide a movement 
in the opposite direction: from outside to inside. 
Within and Without: “Gestus M, Dissidentiam 
noto” 
 
The conceptual understanding of touch offers in 
itself a somewhat contradictory perspective on the 
early modern period, as Elizabeth Harvey and 
others have shown in a recent anthology on touch in 
early modern culture. In her introduction, Harvey 
describes touch as a sense at once elevated and 
debased compared with the other senses and 
explains how, mainly through the legacy of 
Aristotle, sight continued to occupy a primary 
position among the senses, whereas touch was 
more commonly connected to the bestial and/or 
erotic elements of human perception. However, as 
Harvey writes, and as we shall see in William 
Harvey’s medical illustrations further on, “tactility is 
also associated with authoritative scientific, 
medical, even religious, knowledge” (E. Harvey 1). 
The sense of touch thus seems to be at the core of 
inter-related and yet contesting epistemologies 
throughout the early modern period, because touch 
is also a sense traditionally associated with doubt, 
most notably in the example of Thomas wishing to 
touch the wounds of the resurrected Christ. Bulwer 
also refers to Thomas in his section on touch in 
Chirologia and begins the section: “TO FEEL WITH 
THE FINGERS ENDS, is their scepticall expression 
who endeavour to satifie themselves by information 
of the Tact, in the qualities of a thing” (172). While 
providing sensory confirmation, touching can also 
imply an uncertain epistemology; it can be, as 
Bulwer says, an expression of scepticism. We may 
compare this to the illustration provided with the 
telling title “Dissidentiam noto” (Figure 4).  
Here the touching gesture is depicted as the 
index finger of a hand touching two objects 
(smoking-pipes), and part of a burning fire is 
included in the background presumably to illustrate 
the more straightforward and highly useful 
purposes of tactile perception. However, whereas 
the illustration “F” of the pointing index finger 
creates a strong determined line within the frame, 
this touching index finger – and the whole hand it is 
 
 
Figure 4 Detail from diagram from John Bulwer, 
Chirologia.  
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attached to – convey a more hesitating quality. The 
movement appears soft and somewhat awkward as 
if the hand experiences some uncertainty as to the 
effect to touch. Bulwer continues, with a reference 
to Helkiah Crooke’s definitions in 
Microcosmographia: 
 
for although this touching virtue or tactive 
quality be diffused through the whole body 
within and without, as being the foundation 
of the animal being, which may be called 
Animalitas, yet the first and second qualities 
which strike the sense, we doe more 
curiously and exquisitely feele in the Hand, 
then in the other parts, and more exactly 
where the Epidermis or immediate organ of 
the outer touch is thinnest, but most subtily 
in the grape of the Index, which being the 
only part of the body that temperamentum 
ad pondus, is by good right chiefe Touch-
warden to the King of the five senses (172).19  
Bulwer follows Aristotle in associating touch with 
the animal being, but seemingly also Robert Burton, 
who says of touch: “Touch the last of the senses, and 
most ignoble, yet of as great necessity as the other, 
and of as much pleasure. This sense is exquisite in 
men, and by his nerves dispersed all over the body, 
perceives any tactile quality” (101). Touch is thus 
understood as felt within the body as well as 
without, and most of all with and through the index 
finger, but not in this finger’s indicating capacity. 
Bulwer claims that the grape of the index is where 
the skin is thinnest; it is the permeable quality of 
the hand and the index finger in particular - its 
capacity to be a sensory gateway from the outside 
to inwards - that is appreciated here. Compared to 
the pointing finger, which is solely active, this 
implies a simultaneously passive role in the act of 
perception. Pointing asserts the pointing subject’s 
superior distance to the object pointed at. 
Contrastingly, touching can be understood as having 
a destabilising effect on whoever performs it, 
because it is mutual and reciprocal; touching indeed 
annuls the distance between subject and object, for 
in the act of touching how is it possible to 
distinguish between what is touching and what is 
touched? This question provides an important 
starting point for investigating a famous reference 
to touch in a likewise famous Shakespearean stage 
moment: the balcony scene of Romeo and Juliet.   
 
To Touch a Cheek 
 
Shakespeare’s father John Shakespeare is known to 
have been a glover, so there can be little doubt that 
the young William would have grown up in an 
environment scattered with leathery replicas of the 
human hand, and his plays are likewise scattered 
with references to gloves carrying a variety of 
significances. Apart from the glove’s importance in 
determining early modern social status, it is in itself 
a clothing item with complex material quality and 
significance. Its relationship with the hand that 
wears it is peculiarly intimate; when a hand wears a 
glove, the glove is situated in between the hand and 
the world, like a second skin, but it also touches the 
wearer’s hand, while simultaneously being touched 
by it. In investigating Romeo’s wish to be a glove 
upon the hand of Juliet in the balcony scene, this 
double understanding of touch can be crucial: 
 
Her eyes in heaven 
Would through the airy region stream so 
bright 
That birds would sing and think it were not 
night. 
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See how she leans her cheek upon her hand. 
O, that I were a glove upon that hand, 
That I might touch that cheek! 
(2.2.20-25) 
Shakespeare emphasises significance here by 
rhyming hand with hand: “See how she leans her 
cheeks upon her hand/Oh that I were a glove upon 
that hand/That I might touch that cheek”. The hand 
is clearly important enough to be mentioned twice: 
the audience’s attention is called for. On the stage, 
Romeo’s “see how” verbally visualizes the act of 
pointing so that, even if not accompanied by an 
actual physical gesture by the actor, eyes in the 
audience will naturally be directed towards Juliet 
leaning on her hand. But what about touching that 
cheek? Initially the point is that Romeo is not 
touching Juliet; she is the object venerated from a 
distance. But even if he is not physically touching 
her, the sensory references to seeing and touching 
in the passage along with the tactile quality of the 
language begin to bridge that distance: Within three 
lines Romeo moves from implied pointing (“See 
how she..”) to touching (“That I might touch..”); 
from a verbal movement that projects to a verbal 
movement that touches and, even more 
importantly, is touched. Romeo’s words allow him 
to move from observing at a distance to being as 
close to Juliet as possible, in fact closer than 
possible: in between herself and herself (like a 
glove). Significantly, it would not be Romeo 
touching Juliet’s cheek in straightforward 
subject/object fashion, but Juliet touching her own 
cheek with her own hand and Romeo squeezed in 
between: Juliet, Romeo, hand, glove, and cheek, all 
touching each other simultaneously and without 
clear distinction or demarcation. In likening himself 
to a glove, Romeo foregoes his status as sole 
touching subject and becomes, at the same time, 
touched object.  
Heard in this way, the glove presents an 
audacious verbal image: its significance can 
progress beyond the naively erotic manner of the 
courtly lover, to the notion of the lover giving up the 
contours of his own self for the involved co-
existence with the loved one. The movement of 
Romeo can be characterised thus: from his pointing 
finger (whether the gesture is verbal or actual) his 
self flows out towards Juliet’s hand where he 
situates himself in the in-betweenness of her touch, 
and the movement thus flows back from her to him. 
In this sense, this verbal touch echoes the touch of 
the lovers’ hands in the palm-to-palm exchange in 
sonnet form during their first meeting, and the co-
relation may show how closely words and physical 
actions intermingle. As so often in Shakespeare, the 
sounds of the language acquire a tactile quality in 
the sounds of the distinctively pleasurable 
consonant repetitions: “That I might touch that 
cheek”, but there is even more synesthetic quality 
involved in the passage. The sensory effects 
intermingle for the audience who hear Romeo, see 
Juliet, and through hearing and seeing, may 
simultaneously imply the sensation of touch.  
Thus, this moment of the balcony scene relies on 
a particularly sophisticated use of sensory elements 
in effects of early modern theatre; effects which 
have been reiterated very recently by several 
scholars,20 but senses and their perceptual 
capacities are not unambiguously celebrated by 
Shakespeare. Time and again his characters express 
mistrust in what they perceive with eyes, ears, 
noses, or indeed hands, and Romeo himself of 
course comments on the balcony scene with 
foreboding words that imply his misgivings about 
the “substance” of what has just passed: “I am 
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afeared,/Being in the night, all this is but a 
dream,/Too flattering-sweet to be substantial” 
(2.2.140-41). His senses are dulled and flattered by 
the darkness of night and doubt consequently 
applied to the perceived reality. Early modern 
works published over the following decades in a 
very different context, that of science and scientific 
experiments, also show ambivalent attitudes to the 
senses. Such works are both sceptical as to the 
knowledge obtained by sensory perception, as we 
have already seen in references from the work of 
Francis Bacon, but, at the same time, science does 
not seem willing to absolutely abolish the senses, 
and contributes therefore often to the complication 
of epistemological questions rather than providing 
certainty. As we shall see presently, issues of 
science may co-illuminate some of the already 
outlined perceptive and cognitive ambivalences, as 
well as distinctions between subject and object in 
the gestural acts of pointing and touching.  
 
The Scientific Hand – from Pointing to Touching 
to Proving 
Neither bare hand nor unaided intellect 
counts for much; for the business is done 
with instruments and aids, which are no less 
necessary to the intellect than to the hand. 
And just as instruments of the hand stimulate 
or guide its motion, so the instruments of the 
mind prompt or look out for the intellect 
(Novum Organum “Aphorism 2”). 
As new methods and practices evolved within the 
natural sciences throughout the early modern 
period, the former privileged position of the human 
sensory system as the primary catalyst for scientific 
knowledge was downplayed: The use of the senses 
was no longer neither the only nor the best way to 
achieve scientific knowledge, as emphasised by 
Francis Bacon in the quotation above from Novum 
Organum. The hands and eyes of the scientist were 
gradually supplemented and supplanted by new 
instruments and experiments which, especially 
during the seventeenth century, became the 
primary tools in scientific practice. Newly invented 
scientific instruments such as the microscope, 
telescope, and air-pump sparked the view that 
scientific instruments were the only way to achieve 
an objective understanding of nature. The use of 
senses – especially sight – was now linked 
inevitably to the subjectivity of the scientist. But, as 
argued below, the senses in form of the hand 
retained an important role in the visual culture in 
early modern science. The hand and references to 
senses thus are found in especially illustrations in 
late seventeenth-century scientific works. One such 
example is found in Robert Boyle's 1669-
publication “A continuation of new experiments 
physio-mechanical, touching the spring and weight 
of the air and their effects” where the illustration 
depicting Boyle's experiment on barometers and 
atmospheric pressure shows two hands pointing at 
the barometer indicating different levels of 
measurement. And even though the hands in the 
illustration are graphic rather than being 
instrumental or directly involved in the experiment, 
it is worth noting that the hand is indeed still 
present in the illustration. One of the more 
prominent users of the references to senses is in 
fact Descartes who, in Treatise of Man, includes 
hands and eyes in illustrations accompanying his 
observations of the sensory system. Thereby 
Descartes depicts features about the senses by 
referring or pointing to these features through 
hands and eyes. 
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The Pressure of the Hand – Harvey and the 
Circulation of Blood 
 
One of the most important scientific works of the 
seventeenth century, which fuelled the Scientific 
Revolution, is William Harvey's treatise from 1628, 
Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in 
Animalibus. In this work, Harvey presented his 
theory on the circulation of blood, basing his theory 
on different pre-existing medical theories, most 
importantly works by Andreas Vesalius (1514-
1564) and Galen (130-200AD), but offering a 
significant challenge to the Galenic humour theory 
on which we have seen both Burton and Bulwer 
rely. In the Galenic humoral system blood flowed 
through the body via the liver, but Harvey’s 
dissections and experiments proved a different 
theory with the heart as blood-pumping vessel. 
Although ground-breaking, the theory did not 
immediately overthrow Galenic paradigms; 
discourses still co-exist and overlap. Most of 
Harvey’s findings were based upon observations 
and vivisections of a number of different animals, 
but although the major part of Harvey’s work is thus 
focused on animal observations, from around the 
tenth chapter he makes an important shift of focus 
from animals to humans. 
The one iconic drawing in the book thus 
illustrates a human arm: an extension of a sensing 
subject rather than an object. The illustration shows 
how one can prove the circulation through veins 
and arteries by looking at the arm (Figure 5) and is 
part of a series of four drawings (or figures) of an 
arm showing and communicating the process of 
circulation of the blood. As the illustration visually 
instructs, a ligature is secured tightly around the 
upper arm, which subsequently cuts off the blood 
flow from the veins and arteries in the lower arm. 
The following drawings below show how the blood 
flow is stopped (particularly visible in the veins as 
these are situated just underneath the skin), and 
Harvey further points to the now visible valves 
which help push the blood down the arm. Harvey’s 
illustration is described in text over a couple of 
chapters in De Motu Cordis beginning with Chapter 
XI. Throughout the description of the experiment 
and the depiction, significant differences emerge 
between pointing and touching comparable to those 
already explored in this article. Harvey’s description 
of the experiment falls in two central parts: First, he 
describes what happens when the ligature is 
applied to the arm (the first figure of the 
illustration), and secondly he describes the actual 
experiment which shows the nature of the blood 
flow in the arm (the last three figures of the 
illustration). These two parts of Harvey’s argument 
equally represent the transition from pointing to 
touching. In the first part, Harvey relates how, when 
 
Figure 5 Illustration from Harvey’s De Motu 
Cordis instructing how and where to put 
pressure on the arm. 
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a ligature has been tightened around the arm for a 
longer period and then released, the test-subject 
feels warmth streaming down the arm. Here Harvey 
examines the sensory experience of the test-subject; 
we are thus made aware of the fact that there is a 
person behind the arm and that the sensations this 
person feels are relevant to Harvey’s argument. The 
scientist himself, however, is not interfering with 
his test-subject but remains merely observing. 
In the second part of his argumentation, Harvey 
interacts more directly with the arm, thereby 
bridging the gap between himself as observer and 
test-subject. Thus, the scientist moves from pointing 
to touching, but the touch is not just symbolic: 
Harvey describes how he with one finger depresses 
one of the vessel valves in the arm and with another 
finger forces the blood in the vein back and forth, 
thereby “a violence to nature is done” (71), as he 
puts it. It is, then, because Harvey actually touches 
his test-subject and manipulates the blood that he is 
able to prove what he could merely observe in 
animals or in his examinations of the sensory 
experiences of test-subjects. Hence, apart from 
illustrating the features of the experiment with the 
blood flow, the illustration in Harvey's works also 
presents an interesting version of the pointing and 
touching hand: Contrary to the manicule or the 
pointing hand, Harvey's hands not only point to 
where one should look in order to see proof of his 
argument; instead, the hand is also actively touching 
the arm. Furthermore, it is clear that there is a 
subject behind the arm of the experiment, a person 
who is able to sense the warmth and cold depending 
on the tightness of the ligature: The experience of 
the test-subject, therefore, is an important notion in 
Harvey’s description and depiction. In this respect, 
the bridging between the test-subject’s sense and 
the touch of the scientist becomes very prominent. 
Thus, in this case, the hands are indeed pointing 
towards the important part of the observation and 
experiment, but even more importantly, they 
participate in the experiment: It is the hand in the 
illustration which is actively pressing on the veins 
and performing the action necessary for the 
experiment to work. Thereby, the hand of the 
illustration becomes instrumental in proving 
Harvey’s theory about the heart as a blood pumping 
muscle in the establishment of the theory of 
circulation.  
Examination of proof and satisfaction of sense 
information are also essential elements in Hamlet 
written almost three decades before Harvey’s 
treatise, but although Hamlet himself, as we shall 
see, “experiments” with forms of knowledge about 
the human body and mind, doubt remains at the 
core of these relations: there is no firm 
establishment of any given theory. What also marks 
an important link between Harvey and Hamlet in 
what follows, is a transitional understanding of the 
human heart – and, as we shall see, its relationship 
with the human hand. If Harvey’s discovery of blood 
circulation was an all-important challenge to 
predominant early modern understandings of the 
heart, paradigmatic shifts are set in motion: where 
the heart is the embodied seat of spirits and 
emotions as in Galenic humoral theory, it is, to 
Harvey a functional muscle. As a consequence, the 
metaphor of the heart as the seat of emotions can 
become precisely merely a metaphor, as indeed it is 
to the present day.21 In humoral theory human 
inward states and outward signs often correspond 
because both are embodied, as we have seen proof 
of in Bulwer. At the same time, throughout the 
seventeenth century, the relations between inner 
and outer components of the human self are set 
within a continuously shifting framework in which 
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it becomes increasingly difficult to discern between 
materiality of muscle and metaphor of emotion. 
These shifts are very much part of the contradictory 
discourses in Hamlet: a text which, as has often been 
noted, is written at the turn of more things than a 
century.  
* 
 
Hamlet – the Heart and the Hand  
 
In Hamlet relations between body and mind, human 
outward signs and inward states, and unstable 
epistemological issues, provide absolutely central 
parts of the discursive framework of the whole play, 
but in ways that are consistently inconsistent. 
Hamlet contains to an almost overwhelming degree 
all of the issues – and their counterparts – explored 
throughout this article, which makes it a fitting 
example with which to sum up, even if it does not 
provide any easy conclusions. As has been noted by 
many critics, past and present, it is notoriously 
difficult to extract any one systematic statement 
from the play, because it continuously oscillates 
between at least two conflicting statements that 
overlap and change, as in the usually comic 
exchange between Hamlet and Polonius concerning 
the potential shapes of a cloud in the third act: 
 
HAMLET  Do you see yonder cloud that’s 
almost in shape of a camel? 
POLONIUS  By th’ mass and ‘tis like a camel 
indeed 
HAMLET  Methinks it is like a weasel. 
POLONIUS It is backed like a weasel. 
HAMLET  Or like a whale? 
POLONIUS  Very like a whale  
(3.2.368-373). 
Of course Hamlet may be mainly exposing the old 
counsellor’s insincerity in humouring his own 
rapidly changing statements and there is also a 
somewhat sinister element underlying the 
exchange, because it is their last encounter, before 
Hamlet mistakenly kills Polonius behind the arras in 
the closet scene, which we will investigate shortly. 
However, in a different perspective the exchange 
can be seen as a parody of a poorly performed 
experiment in which observation of a constantly 
changing form (such as a cloud) only leads to 
arbitrary conclusions and the knowledge provided 
by the senses is unreliable, to say the least. If there 
is a sarcastic comment on the reliability of empirical 
observation implied in this, it could be rendered 
even more tangible during the open-air 
performances at The Globe with real clouds visible 
overhead. It is one of several passages, which 
potentially epitomizes the play as in itself a kind of 
experiment that leaves no epistemology 
unexplored, but offers no a priori arguments, nor 
any a posteriori conclusions. In other words, it 
adheres to Bacon and Descartes’s sceptical 
statements on doubt as the necessary starting point 
on the path to knowledge quoted in our 
introduction, but where Bacon and Descartes begin 
in doubts in order to end with certainties, Hamlet 
arguably continues and remains in doubts in order 
to avoid certainties.22  
The play begins famously with Horatio’s 
sceptical questioning of the ghost’s appearance to 
the soldiers: he “will not let belief take hold of him” 
(1.1.23) till he has seen it with his own eyes. This 
questioning of the ghost’s appearance and message 
is later reinforced by Hamlet himself, who, although 
appearing fully convinced that the ghost is indeed 
his “father’s spirit” when he first encounters it, later 
finds it necessary to test what he has actually seen 
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and heard through “The Mousetrap,” the play re-
enacting the murder as described by the ghost: “I’ll 
have grounds/More relative than this. The play’s 
the thing/Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the 
king” (Q1, 3.1.538-540). 23  
Howard Marchitello, in the essay “Artifactual 
Knowledge in Hamlet,” has discussed these issues 
in-depth claiming that “The Mousetrap” is 
effectually Hamlet’s take on a rapidly developing 
early modern scientific instalment: the experiment. 
But does Hamlet gain any certainty of knowledge 
from this “experiment”? The problem here is again 
symptomatic of the play’s inter-conflicting 
statements: Claudius’ reaction (expressed through 
body language) is taken as trustworthy, but in 
several places elsewhere Hamlet notoriously 
reiterates the unreliability of such outward signs, 
because “they are actions that a man might play” 
(1.2.84). Importantly, scepticism in Hamlet is thus 
not just a question of what the body can know, but 
also of what can be known about the body, 
especially if the body has a complex and unresolved 
relationship with its outside and inside components. 
The question shifting back and forth in the play 
between sensory perception as reliable and 
unreliable is linked to the similarly alternately 
severed and linked connection between outward 
signs and inward states, which David Hillman has 
explored extensively in Shakespeare’s Entrails: 
Belief, Skepticism and the Interior of the Body. In the 
introduction to this book, Hillman formulates an 
important description of the shifting 
understandings of the human body in early modern 
England:  
The body was losing its ontological standing 
of primacy and having to struggle, as it were, 
in the realms of epistemology – a position 
from which it has never recovered. One could 
almost say that, gradually forfeiting its aura 
of presence or givenness, the body now had 
to defend itself, and one way of doing so in 
early modern England was through recourse 
to fantasies of a clearly defined boundary 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ (6).  
“’Seems’, madam - nay it is, I know not ‘seems’” 
(1.2.76). Hamlet’s already alluded to declaration 
early in the play in response to his mother 
questioning his signs of grief is what Hillman calls “a 
paradigmatically skeptical avowal of the 
unbridgeable gap between the ‘inner’ and the 
‘outer’” (85). In his first sustained speech Hamlet 
describes a series of gestural signs of grief – such as 
tears and sighs – and likens them to “actions that a 
man might play” (1.2.84) compared to having “that 
within which passes show,/These but the trappings 
and the suits of woe” (1.2.86). Tremendous amounts 
of scholarship have been devoted to the question of 
what Hamlet is hiding “within:” the question of what 
kind of subjectivity – pre-modern, early modern, or 
indeed modern – can be extracted from the play, so 
we will not here repeat what has been extensively 
explored for decades.24 Instead we will condense 
our focus to one particular gesture, significantly 
related to this question: Gertrude’s wringing her 
hands in the closet scene. This gesture, which also 
appears in Bulwer’s Chirologia as already 
mentioned in our section on Titus Andronicus, 
occurs immediately after the mistaken murder of 
Polonius. It is implied in Hamlet’s comment on his 
mother’s distressed reaction which rekindles his 
intent of “speaking daggers” to her: “– Leave 
wringing of your hands. Peace, sit you down / And 
let me wring your heart” (3.4.32-33). Bulwer’s full 
description of “Ploro” is as follows: 
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TO WRING THE HANDS is a natural 
expression of excessive grief used by those 
who condole, bewail and lament. Of which 
gesture that elegant expositor of nature 
(Francis Bacon in Sylva Sylvarum) hath 
assigned this reason: sorrow which 
diminisheth the body it affects provokes by 
wringing of the mind, tears, the sad 
expressions of the eyes, which (tears) are 
produced and caused by the contradiction of 
the spirits of the brain, which contradiction 
doth strain together the moisture of the 
brain, constraining thereby tears into the 
easy; from which compression of the brain 
proceeds the HARD WRINGING OF THE 
HANDS which is a gesture of expression of 
moisture (28). 
Bulwer (and Bacon before him) here directly 
connects the outward signs of sorrow – tears and 
the wringing of hands – with an inward 
physiological state: the wringing of the brain caused 
by the spirits also encountered in humoral theory. 
Grief is here distinctly described as an embodied 
emotion operating via “spirits” between and 
through inner organs such as brain and heart. So it 
may well be in Gertrude’s case, but, at the same 
time, there is reason to question whether Gertrude’s 
heart is to be understood in a physiological or 
psychological context; whether it is the bodily seat 
of distress and grief or the metaphor thereof. 25 The 
answer, as so often in the play, is likely to be both, 
and this places Hamlet’s understanding intriguingly 
somewhere between Galen and Harvey as well as in 
puzzling relation to Bulwer. 
In fact, Hamlet seems at first to imply the 
contradiction of Bulwer’s description: a severed 
connection between outer sign and inward state: 
Gertrude’s hand-wringing is an “action that a 
(wo)man might play”. Hamlet’s task then is to re-
connect outer and inner by wringing her heart: “If it 
be made of penetrable stuff,/If damned custom have 
not brazed it so/That it be proof and bulwark 
against sense” (3.4.34-35). It appears that he 
succeeds, if we are to believe Gertrude’s lines a little 
later: “Thou turn’st my very eyes into my soul” 
(3.4.88). However, this turning Gertrude inside out 
ought also to be counterpoised with Hamlet’s 
exchange about his own heart – and what it hides –  
with Guildenstern by the end of the scene 
containing the performance of “The Mousetrap” 
which almost immediately precedes the closet 
scene. The significant prop in this brief exchange is 
the recorder, to which Hamlet compares himself 
accusing his old school friend of wanting to draw 
out his secret, of wanting to “play upon” him: “You 
would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out 
the heart of my mystery” (3.2.356-57). The 
exchange has been expertly analysed by Graham 
Holderness, who writes that “scepticism denies the 
inherence of inner in outer, and assumes a gap 
between inner truth and outer display. The sceptic 
assumes that outer display in others is probably 
misleading (actions that a man might play)” (305), 
which is undeniably the case here.  
What is also important to also add in our context 
is attention to the recorder itself, because it is 
indeed an instrument to be handled; music is to be 
drawn out from it by the correct placement of 
fingers. As Guildenstern says “I know no touch of it, 
my lord” (3.2.348): the skill required is manual. 
Hamlet, however, implies a human interior that 
cannot be handled, that cannot be touched, that 
there in fact exists a place where the hand cannot 
enter. Not even the hand of the anatomist, for 
Hamlet’s words “the heart of my mystery” seem to 
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denote a metaphorical as well as a material space. 
The heart of Hamlet’s mystery is safe from outside 
interpretation, but few minutes later he penetrates 
his mother’s heart proving again the changeable 
nature of epistemological statements about what 
can be known with and about the body in the play. 
To Bulwer wringing one’s hands clearly denotes a 
direct corresponding inner state, but in Hamlet this 
correspondence is alternately contradicted and 
confirmed within the space of two preceding scenes. 
The fact that Hamlet predates Bulwer by several 
decades – and the fact that both Burton’s Anatomy 
of Melancholy and Harvey’s De Motu Cordis are 
published in between respectively in 1621 and 
1628 – is arguably proof of the non-linear 
development of these shifting paradigms in the 
early modern period: the relations between 
Hamlet’s hearts and hands thus represent a cross-
section of our cross-over examples. 
 
Handling the Theme of Hands: Conclusive 
Remarks 
 
We have used the example of human hand, and in 
part its two familiar functions of pointing and 
touching, in order to explore, but by no means fully 
exhaust, early modern epistemological questions 
related to ”Matter, mind and spirit”. The intention 
has been to follow the hand as a thread through 
multiple and interwoven discourses in early 
modern England, creating a dialogue between the 
different, but also overlapping disciplines as a 
useful co-illuminating factor. Bulwer, Harvey and 
Shakespeare are all handling similar questions of 
how to understand relations between mind and 
body, but in significantly different ways that prove 
the non-linearity in the development of these 
paradigms. All three writers are pre-Cartesian, but 
that does not mean that they simply represent a 
paradigmatic embodied understanding of human 
perception and cognition that changed for good 
with Descartes and his Enlightenment legacy. 
Rather they show how continuously relative such 
discourses were throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The human hand, which we 
have suggested represents a gateway between mind 
and body, between inner states and outward 
expressions, is thus found where discourses 
overlap. Bulwer’s gesture “M” with the 
accompanying illustration entitled “sollicite cogito,” 
“I think anxiously,” (Figure 6) can be said to 
encompass, in a very condensed manner, some of 
these overlapping discourses – and the often 
accompanying anxiety in early modern thinking.  
The illustration shows a thinking subject whose 
thinking process is hidden and yet revealed in body 
language – this is one of Bulwer’s illustrations 
which contain a torso and head as well as a hand – 
and the gesture is the, even to modern eyes, very 
familiar scratching of the head. The question as to 
why humans scratch their heads while thinking, 
Bulwer answers thus: “But why we should in 
earnest meditation so naturally expresse our 
endeavour by this recourse of the hand to the head, 
 
 
Figure 6 Detail from diagram from John Bulwer, 
Chirologia.  
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to scratch where it doth not itch; is, may be, to rouse 
up our distracted intellect” (85-86). A hand used to 
rouse up a distracted intellect shows a an 
interdependent, but at the same time confused 
relation between the body and the mind; between 
material and immaterial understandings of the 
human self that are highly important to continue 
exploring in the context of the early modern period. 
Our attempt described as “handling the theme of 
hands” points out the implication of performing 
material act (handling) with an immaterial notion (a 
theme). To handle a theme, as we have realised 
here, is literally trying to grasp the ungraspable – a 
fundamental paradox that characterises the early 
modern hand and its epistemological significances. 
 
 
* 
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1 This catalogue was published for the exhibition Writing on Hands: Memory and Knowledge in Early Modern 
Europe, conceived by guest curator Claire Richter Sherman and organized by The Trout Gallery, Dickinson College, 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in cooperation with the Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D.C. in 2000 and 2001. 
Besides the catalogue an interactive website was created: http://handoc.com/WritingOnHands/index.html. 
2The early modern period is here the conventionally understood timeframe of 1450-1750. Dealing with material 
beyond this time-frame or indeed questioning the time-frame itself, is beyond the scope of this article as our main 
examples for analysis are all from sixteenth-and seventeenth-century England. Furthermore, we deal only with 
examples from printed materials and thus not handwritten or hand-drawn materials.   
3 The OED entry for the verb “to perceive” is not irrelevant here, as it in fact reads: “To take in or apprehend with 
the mind or the senses.” Key differences in descriptions of early modern perception can be read into this definition 
and several of the questions explored by this article are precisely between “taking in” or “apprehending with the mind 
or the senses”. 
4In recent decades scholars have explored early modern notions of the embodied self to great extent: important 
works include Michael Carl Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in 
Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (1999); Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the 
Shakespearean Stage (2004); as well as Bruce R. Smith’s historical phenomenology influencing several very recent 
publications on early modern senses, emotion and affect. 
5This account of outer and inner senses appears in Burton, Part 1, “Anatomy of the Soul,” subsections V-VII, (98-
101). Similar understandings of the senses and perception appear in important works from the period with some 
variations: Helkiah Crooke’s Microcosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man (1615); Thomas Wright’s On the 
Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601, 1604,1621,1630); and Edward Reynoldes,  A Treatise of the Passions and 
Faculties of the Soule of Man (1647). The concept of the ‘common sense’ was derived from Aristotle, for an extensive 
account see Daniel Heller Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (2007).   
6 See Burton, Part 1, ”Anatomy of the Soul,” subsections IX-X, (104-105).   
7 Descartes writes: “This ‘me’, that is to say, the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is 
even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is” 
(Discourse 101). 
8 The revival of scepticism is by historians inextricably linked to ongoing theological debates in the context of the 
Reformation. See for example Hamlin, Tragedy and Skepticism in Shakespeare’s England (2005). Landau also discusses 
the connection between the revival of scepticism and the disputes over religious dogma during the Reformation in 
”’Let me not burst in Ignorance’: Skepticism and Anxiety in Hamlet” (2010). 
9 Bacon, for example, also writes that: “By far the greatest hindrance and distortion of the human intellect stems 
from the dullness, inadequacy, and unreliability of the senses” (Novum Organum 87). 
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10 For a more detailed account and discussion of these different early modern epistemologies see for example 
Gallagher and Raman, introduction to Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment and Cognition (2010), pp. 1-29. Or 
Hillman, introduction to Shakespeare’s Entrails: Belief, Scepticism and the Interior of the Body (2007), pp.1-57. 
11 This argument is also important in twentieth century phenomenology, particularly in the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and has been recently explored significantly within the contexts of what is known as ”historical 
phenomenology” by Bruce R. Smith, particularly in Phenomenal Shakespeare (2010): see for example (xvii-xviii).   
12 See for example Roach, (1985) or Astington, (2010). 
13 The fact that the same actors were evidently influenced by verbal and non-verbal methods of rhetoric also 
provides a link to Bulwer: See Roach (1985) or Astington (2010), as well as Thomas Heywood’s well-known An 
Apology for Actors (1612) which ostensibly emphasizes acting as rhetorical art. 
14 Bulwer is by no means the first or only advocate of this notion. It is found in Quintillian’s Institutio oratoria (first 
century AD). See Kendon, (2004) p.18. 
15See Descartes, Treatise of Man (De homine, 1662 and Traite de l’homme, 1664): “I assume their body to be but a 
statue, an earthen machine” (1). 
16 The whole play may indeed be read as a complex comment on an interplay between words and bodies, as Mary 
L. Fawcett has shown in an influential essay “Arms/Words/Tears: Language and the Body in Titus Andronicus” (1983). 
17 Jonathan Bate also mentions this in his notation of the Arden edition of the play (n9-11, 206). 
18 For an extensive account of the manicule see Sherman (2008). 
19 Touch was sometimes referred to as ”the king of the five senses” (E. Harvey 1, n1.); an epitaph that contradicts 
its Aristotelian hierarchical status showing further its ambivalent place in early modern discourse. 
20 See for example Craik and Pollard (2013) or (Karim-Cooper and Stern (2013).  
21 For an example of how scholars have discussed the relationship between metaphor and materiality – 
differences in meaning between modern and early modern psychology – in recent decades see for example 
Schoenfeldt (1999) p. 8. 
22 For accounts and discussions of classical scepticism in early modern England and in Shakespeare’s writing see 
Hamlin (2005) or Bell (2002). 
23 In the case of Horatio, senses are reliable in at least ascertaining the existence of the ghost whatever it may be or 
represent, but the play then proceeds to significantly complicate this epistemology, by offering its opposite. As 
Howard Marchitello writes: “Hamlet is important to this discussion of the senses in early modern culture in part 
because it marks a crossroads, a moment of the jarring coincidence of two radically opposed epistemologies 
distinguished above all by the different ways in which the body’s role is understood. On the one hand, thinking 
happens only through the body and its properly functioning perceptions. On the other hand, Shakespeare’s era 
witnessed an increasingly serious skepticism over their viability to secure knowledge” (139). 
24 See for example Holderness (2009) for an extremely helpful overview and discussion of this. 
25 Hillman argues that Hamlet represents precisely a striding of both meanings in relation to the heart; the 
transition from materiality to metaphor has not yet been made, but is in the making: “the play itself is one of the 
central transitional points between the physical and the ‘spiritual’ in Western culture; Hamlet’s death a corporeal 
representation of these faultlines, half-metaphorical, half-somatic: ‘Now cracks a noble heart’ (5.2.364)” (116).    
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